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Impact Trauma As "Legal Cause" of Cancer
Donald J. Ladanyi*C ONSIDER THE FOLLOWING HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION: A voluptuous
blonde is window shopping along New York's fashionable Fifth
Avenue. Her trek brings her to a corner street intersection which she
begins to cross. A recklessly driven automobile careens around the
corner and strikes the defenseless blonde pedestrian amidships, causing
her to be hurled against a utility pole. Her breast strikes the pole and
absorbs the full effect of the impact. A local hospital determines that
her injuries consist of only a black and blue bruise spot on her breast.
The swelling, due to the injury, subsides and the discoloration disap-
pears within a short time. Two months later a routine breast examina-
tion reveals a lump within the breast in exactly the same location as
the trauma. The examiner suggests that she enlist the aid of a physician.
An operation is performed. A malignant, nonmetastasized mass is ex-
cised. The operation terminates with a radical mastectomy.
The Issue
Was the impact trauma the cause of the cancer? According to the
medical profession, there is no experimental proof that a single trauma
may cause cancer.' That the cause of cancer is unknown is repeatedly
asserted in reported cancer cases. 2 However, lawsuits deal not with
the question of medical cause but rather with the question of legal
causation. Legal, rather than medical, questions must be dealt with in
order to determine causation.
* B.S.E., Cleveland State University; Second-year student at Cleveland State Uni-
versity College of Law.
t Brooke, In the Wake of Trauma 359, 420 (1957); Curran, Law & Medicine 77 (1960);
Crane, The Relationship of a Single Act of Trauma to Subsequent Malignancy-
Uncomplicated Trauma and Cancer, in Moritz and Helberg, Trauma and Disease 147
(1959); Curphy, Trauma and Tumours, 1 J. For. Sci. 27, 28 (1956).
2 Recovery allowed: Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Thompson, 211 F. 889 (4th Cir.
1914); Hagy v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 122 Cal. App. 2d 361, 265 P. 2d 86 (1953);
Lee v. Blessing, 131 Conn. 569, 41 A. 2d 337 (1945); Slack v. Percival Co., 198 Iowa
54, 199 N.W. 323 (1924); Pittman v. Pillsbury Flour Mills, Inc., 234 Minn. 517, 48 N.W.
2d 735 (1951); Freese v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 58 S.W. 2d 758 (Mo. App. 1933);
White v. Valley Land Co., 64 N. M. 9, 322 P. 2d 707 (1957); Posan v. Industrial
Comm., 61 Ohio App. 530, 532, 22 N.E. 2d 1014, 1015 (1939); Hanna v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
52 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 259 N.E. 2d 177, 180 (Dayton Mun. Ct. 1970); Sligh v. Newberry
Elec. Co-op., 216 S. C. 401, 58 S.E. 2d 675 (1950); Jeffers v. Marretta Mills, 190 S. C.
435, 3 S.E. 2d 489 (1939); Boyd v. Young, 193 Tenn. 272, 246 S.W. 2d 10 (1951); Salt
Lake City v. Industrial Comm., 104 Utah 436, 140 P. 2d 644 (1943); Utah Fuel Co. v.
Industrial Comm., 102 Utah 26, 126 P. 2d 1070 (1942); Winchester Milling Corp. v.
Sencindiver, 148 Va. 388, 138 S.E. 479 (1927); Harbor Plywood Corp. v. Department
of Labor & Indus., 48 Wash. 2d, 553, 295 P. 2d 310 (1956).
Recovery denied: Tonkovich v. Department of Labor & Indus., 131 Wash. Dec. 192,
195 P. 2d 638 (1948); Boyer v. Dept. of Labor & Indus., 160 Wash. 557, 295 P. 737
(1931).
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Useful Terminology
Familiarity with the following terms is necessary in order to under-
stand the cancer causation cases:
A benign tumor is not malignant. It grows slowly, does not metasta-
size to other areas, and causes harm only by its pressure against ad-
jacent tissue or accidental complications. 3
A biopsy is a procedure wherein a whole or segment of a tumor
is removed for microscopic examination in order to determine the cell's
structure.
4
Cancer is an inclusive term which comprehends all malignant
growths regardless of the type of tissue or cell from which derived.5
Carcinoma is a cancer with an epithelial tissue origin. It may cover
portions of the external skin surface, line body organs, or occupy
cavities.6
Etiology refers to the cause of disease.7
A malignant tumor grows rapidly and tends to metastasize.8
Metastasis is the transfer of the cancer from its initial location to
a secondary location through the blood vessels or lymph channels. 9
Neoplastic process or neoplasia are terms used to describe an "au-
tonomous new growth of tissue." 10
A sarcoma is a malignant tumor arising from connective and sup-
porting tissues such as bone, muscle, blood vessels, and lymph-nodes. 11
A trauma is an injury or damage to the body.12 It may be caused
by an impact: a single mechanical force acting upon the body.13
A traumatic cancer is a malignant tumor following a single uncom-
plicated mechanical injury, uncomplicated in that it is free from pro-
longed infection or chronic irritation. 14
3 5 Lawyers' Med. Cyc. § 38.1 (1960); Adelson, Injury and Cancer, in, Physician in
the Courtroom 11 (Schroeder ed. 1954).
4 Russell and Clark, Medico-Legal Considerations of Trauma and Other External
Influences in Relationship to Cancer, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 868, 871 (1953).
5 5 Lawyers' Med. Cyc., supra n. 3.
6 Hueper, Trauma and Cancer, 1 Trauma 47, 55 (1959).
7 Stedman, Medical Dictionary 357 (11th ed. 1930).
s Willis, Pathology of Tumors (1st ed. 1948); Adelson, supra n. 3.
9 Flaxman, Trauma and Cancer, 1958 Med. Trial Tech. Q. 223, 224-25; Russell and
Clark, supra n. 4.
10 Ewing, Neoplastic Diseases 9 (4th ed. 1940).
11 Hueper, supra n. 6, at 64; 5 Lawyers' Med. Cyc., supra n. 3.
12 Brahdy & Kahn, Clinical Approach to Alleged Traumatic Disease, 23 B.UJL. Rev.
238 n. 1 (1943).
13 Warren, Criteria Required to Prove Causation of Occupational or Traumatic Tu-
mors, 10 U. Chi. L. Rev. 313, 318 (1943).




A tumor is "an abnormal proliferation of cells which serves no use-
ful function, disturbs the normal relationships of tissues, and in com-
parison with other types of cellular growth, is relatively autonomous." 15
Basis for "Legal Causation" of Cancer
Case law reveals that two types of claims confront the judge and
the workmen's compensation commissioner: (1) Those alleging that
the trauma caused the cancer,1 and (2) Those alleging that the trauma
aggravated a pre-existing cancer. 17 The claim must be supported by suf-
ficient evidence to prove a reasonable connection between the plain-
tiff's harm and the defendant's conduct in order to sustain a recovery
in tort.' s Workmen's compensation cases require proof that the claim-
ant's injury was caused by an accident "arising out of and in the
course of employment." 19 The problem then is to determine what factors
the administrative and judicial tribunals consider in evaluating the evi-
dence to prove causation. One golden thread that binds case histories
together to reveal these factors is Ewing's "postulates." 20
Ewing's Postulates
In order to prove the existence of a causal relation of trauma to
cancer, Dr. James Ewing has established minimal criteria. It must be
pointed out that his criteria are used to achieve sufficient medical cer-
tainty.
1. Previous integrity of the wounded part. This postulate is the
most difficult to prove by direct evidence, since- it must be shown that
the situs was free of cancer prior to the traumatic insult.2 1 In order to
achieve absolute medical certainty, a complete cell examination of the
situs tissue would be necessary prior to the trauma. The basis of legal
15 Moritz, Pathology of Tumors (1st ed. 1948).
16 Lee v. Blessing, supra n. 2; Emma v. A. D. Julliard & Co., 75 R.I. 94, 63 A. 2d 786
(1940).
1T Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Godard, 93 Ga. App. 671, 92 S.E. 2d 626 (1956); Town
& Blank, Inc., v. Curtis, 141 Ind. App. 115, 226 N.E. 2d 551 (1967); Johnson v. Skelly
Oil Co., 181 Kan. 655, 312 P. 2d 1076 (1957); Sullivan's Case, 345 Mass. 762, 186 N.E.
2d 601 (1962); Dixie Pine Prod. Co. v. Dependents of Bryant, 228 Miss. 595, 89 S. 2d
589 (1956); Celeste v. Progressive Silk Finishing Co., 72 N.J. Super. 125, 178 A. 2d
74 (1962); Jackson v. Aarlin Realty Co., 23 App. Div. 2d 598, 256 N.Y.S. 2d 354
(1965); Smith v. Erie County, 15 App. Div. 2d 585, 221 N.Y.S. 2d 756 (1961); De An-
gelo v. American Can. Co., 11 App. Div. 2d 571, 200 N.Y.S. 2d 614 (1960); Sikora v.
Apex Beverage Corp., 282 App. Div. 193, 122 N.Y.S. 2d 64 (1953), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 917,
119 N.E. 2d 601 (1954); Glover v. Columbia Hosp., 236 S.C. 410, 114 S.E. 2d 565 (1960);
Kimbell v. Noel, 228 S.W. 2d 980 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); City of Seymour v. Industrial
Comm., 25 Wis. 2d 482, 131 N.W. 2d 323 (1964).
18 Prosser, Torts § 41 (3rd ed. 1960).
19 Larson, Legal Aspects of Causation in Workmen's Compensation, 8 Rutgers L. Rev.
423, 425 (1954).
20 J. Ewing, Neoplastic Diseases (4th ed. 1940).
21 Id.
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1971
20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (2)
certainty, however, on this postulate is obscure. Courts apparently are
not too concerned with this requirement in that recovery generally re-
quires a mere showing that the injured situs was normal in all re-
spects at the time of the mishap.2 2 Perhaps, where possible, the best
practice would be to plead that the trauma either caused the cancer
or aggravated and accelerated it.23 An injury is compensable whether
it causes a disease or merely aggravates an existing infirmity. 24
2. The nature, authenticity, and severity of the trauma. Dr. Ewing
states a minimum effect as the criterion for the trauma: a rupturing
of small blood vessels accompanied by hemorrhaging and discoloration
of the skin.23 A single blow may start the regenerative cancer process. 26
The injury is often very minor.27 One court has even held that the
severity of the trauma is irrelevant.28 This postulate has negligible
value in establishing a causal relation between trauma and cancer.29
3. Cancer diagnosis. Identification of cancer may be accomplished
by several methods. Presently, the best method of positive identification
is by biopsy.3 0 Clinical diagnosis and X-ray pictures are used although
the results are medically questionable. However, any question of cancer
diagnosis is within the province of the jury.3 l
4. Origin of the cancer at the place of the injury. Perhaps the most
important of the postulates is this one, in that the cancer must develop
at the exact situs of the trauma.3 2 A claim for damages based on a
cancer which develops at a location other than the area of trauma may
be denied.33
22 Pittman v. Pillsbury Flour Mills, supra n. 2 at 739; Hertz v. Watab Paper Co., 184
Minn. 1, 3, 237 N.W. 610, 611 (1931); Peterson v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 259
S.W. 2d 789 (Mo. 1953); Winchester Milling Corp. v. Sencindiver, supra n. 2 at 395.
23 See Dundee Woolen Mills v. Chism, 215 Ark. 126, 219 S.W. 2d 628 (1949); Beatty
v. Chandeysson Elec. Co., 238 Mo. App. 868, 190 S.W. 2d 648 (1945); Dalgeish v. Op-
penheim Collins & Co., 302 Pa. 88, 152 A. 759 (1930).
24 Dundee Woolen Mills v. Chism, supra n. 23; Gaetz v. City of Melrose, 155 Minn.
330, 193 N.W. 691 (1923); Hogan v. Twin City Amusement Trust Estate, 155 Minn.
199, 193 N.W. 122 (1923); Restatement of Torts § 461 (1934).
25 Ewing, supra n. 20.
26 Charleston Shipyards, Inc. v. Lawson, 227 F. 2d 110 (4th Cir. 1955); Daly v. Verg-
stedt, 267 Minn. 244, 126 N.W. 2d 242 (1964); Barker v. J. J. Newberry Co., 279 App.
Div. 704, 108 N.Y.S. 2d 463 (1951); Kimbell v. Noel, supra n. 17.
27 Custer v. Higgins Indus., Inc., 24 S. 2d 511 (La. App. 1946); Ellis v. Common-
wealth, 182 Va. 293, 28 S.E. 2d 730 (1944).
28 Ellis v. Commonwealth, supra n. 27; Winchester Milling Corp. v. Sencindiver,
supra n. 2.
29 Hueper, supra n. 6 at 47.
30 United States v. Hoxsey Cancer Clinic, 198 F. 2d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 1952).
31 Gluckstein v. Lipsett, 93 Cal. App. 2d 391, 209 P. 2d 98 (1949); Svetecz v. Newark
Gear Cutting Mach. Co., 135 N.J.L. 524, 53 A. 2d 220 (1947).
32 Lee v. Blessing, supra n. 2, De Angelo v. American Can. Co., supra n. 17, Avesato
v. Paul Tishman Co., 142 N.Y.S. 2d 760 (Bronx County Sup. Ct. 1955); Menarde v.
Philadelphia Transp. Co., 376 Pa. 497, 103 A. 2d 681 (1954).
33 Frankenheim v. B. Altman & Co., 13 Misc. 2d 1079, 177 N.Y.S. 2d 302 (Sup. Ct.




In the hypothetical situation, if a biopsy had revealed cancerous
cells within the breast but of a structurally different neoplastic nature,
serious doubt would arise as to whether the injury caused the detected
cancerous growth. Medical science has demonstrated that neoplasms
duplicate the cell structure from which they originally derive. Thus,
liver cancer cells found in the breast would indicate the tumor as
metastatic in origin.34
5. Reasonable time relationship between the date of trauma and
the appearance of the cancer. Interestingly, no minimum or maximum
time interval between the trauma and the detection of cancer has been
universally accepted as a standard-to rule out a causal relationship.
In Dr. Ewing's opinion the tumor must appear no earlier than three
weeks subsequent to the injury or no later than three years.35 The
lack of a standard time limitation has caused some disparity in the
cases.30 One plaintiff whose tumor appeared at the end of sixty days
was allowed recovery while another was denied recovery.37 Until medi-
cal experts can establish with certainty the minimum and maximum
time standards between trauma and the development of cancer, the
question of what is a reasonable time must remain with the jury.
6. Character or structure of the resulting growth. The resulting
tumor must be uncomplicated in cell structure and related cellularly to
the injured tissue,38 so as to demonstrate that the tumor has not metasta-
sized from another area.39 Again, the best method to prove that the
tumor is not metastatic in origin is to identify the cancerous tissue by
biopsy.4"
Strict judicial adherence to these criteria would result in the estab-
lishment of causation to the highest degree of medical certainty pres-
ently possible. Requiring such stringent proof would result in few re-
coveries, however. To circumvent such an insurmountable obstacle,
the courts have generally been rather lax in their requirements of
proof based on the "postulates." Thus, the belief that strict proof of
each of Ewing's postulates would be an undue hardship upon deserving
claimants has resulted in the development of the less stringent "se-
quence-of-events test." 41
34 Rhodes v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 27 S. 2d 388 (La. App. 1946) (Hip cancer
metastasized from lung).
35 Ewing, supra n. 20 at 108.
38 Lee v. Blessing, supra n. 2.
37 Dennison v. Wing, 279 App. Div. 494, 110 N.Y.S. 2d 811 (1952).
38 Ewing, supra n. 20.
39 Rhodes v. American Cent. Ins. Co., supra n. 34.
40 United States v. Hoxsey Cancer Clinic, supra n. 30.
41 Eidman, Trauma and Cancer, 24 Ins. Counsel J. 421, 425 (1957); Russell & Clark,
supra n. 4; Warren, supra n. 13.
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Sequence-of-Events Test
The essence of this test, which is used extensively by courts in ag-
gravation cases, 4 2 is that since cancer follows the injury, the injury must
be the cause.43 The essence may be restated: If the court finds the
presence of valid bridging symptoms, the court will also find a causal
relation.44 "Bridging symptoms" are defined as "symptoms that continue
to give evidence of the continuance of disability from the time the in-
jury is sustained to the time the tumor makes its appearance." 4- Thus,
if the claimant was in apparently good health before the trauma and a
subsequent disability immediately occurred, which progressively in-
creased until cancer was diagnosed, this sequence of events raises a
persuasive inference that the injury was a substantial factor in pro-
ducing the cancer.46 However, sufficient medical testimony will rebut
this presumption.47
Aggravation or Acceleration of Pre-existing Condition
Medical authorities "know that many ailments may be aggravated
and their harmful or fatal end accelerated by trauma." 54s At issue is
the question of how the trauma actually stimulates pre-existing tumor
growth. Trauma may perform a beneficial function by damaging or
cutting off the tumor cells' blood supply with the result that the can-
cerous cells die.49 However, the rupture or perforation of cancerous
tissue may cause the cancer to metastasize.50 Another theory espouses
that the trauma may directly cause aggravation, thus hastening death.
This theory receives the greatest acknowledgment. 5 1
42 Smith v. White Pine Lumber Co., 53 Idaho 808, 27 P. 2d 965 (1933); Lyons v.
Swift & Co., infra n. 51; Smith v. Kiel, 115 S.W. 2d 38 (Mo. App. 1938); White v.
Valley Land Co., supra n. 2; Sligh v. Newberry Elec. Co-op., supra n. 2.
43 Winchester Milling Corp. v. Sencindiver, supra n. 2.
44 Lyons v. Swift & Co., infra n. 51; Taylor v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co.,
infra n. 55; White v. Valley Land Co., supra n. 2; Hughes v. Eastley Cotton Mill No.
1, 210 S.C. 193, 42 S.E. 2d 64 (1947).
45 Warren, supra n. 13.
46 Pixley v. Employers' Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., infra n. 51; Taylor v. Mansfield Hard-
wood Lumber Co., infra n. 55; Austin v. Red Wing Sewer Pipe Co., 163 Minn. 397,
204 N.W. 323 (1925); Avesato v. Morell-Brown Inc., 7 App. Div. 2d 796, 180 N.Y.S.
2d 897 (1958); Sligh v. Newberry Elec. Co-op., supra n. 2.
47 Brown v. Ashford, 252 S.W. 2d 7 (Ky. App. 1952); Margoner v. American Marine
Corp., 120 S. 2d 281 (La. App. 1960).
48 Blackfoot Coal & Land Corp. v. Cooper, 121 Ind. App. 313, 95 N.E. 2d 639, 643
(1950).
49 Avesato v. Paul Tishman Co., supra n. 32.
50 Sikora v. Apex Beverage Corp., supra n. 17.
51 Pixley v. Employers' Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 102 S. 2d 113 (La. App. 1958); Lyons v.
Swift & Co., 86 S. 2d 613 (La. App. 1956); New Orleans and Northeastern R. R. v.
Thornton, 247 Miss. 794, 157 S. 2d 129 (1966); Dixie Pine Prod. Co. v. Dependents of
Bryant, supra n. 17; Ricciardi v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 47 N.J. Super. 90, 135 A. 2d 339




Generally, the criteria to establish aggravation or acceleration are
similar to those used to prove original causation. To avoid any legal
complications when the claimant concedes a pre-existing cancer, several
factors should be proved. It should be proved that the trauma was to
the cancer itself and not to the surrounding tissue.5 2 If this burden
of proof is not sustained, the result may be fatal. 3 It must be proved
that the tumor existed prior to the injury, but this may be inferred.54
In addition, it must be proved that the growth rate of the cancer in-
creased or that the trauma caused metastasis.55
Notable Cases
As previously stated, the majority of cancer cases raises one of the
following issues: (1) whether the trauma caused the cancer, or (2)
whether the trauma aggravated or accelerated a pre-existing tumor.
The sequence of events test 56 was applied to the facts in Austin
v. Red Wing Sewer Pipe Co.5 7 The plaintiff was unloading coal from
a gondola car as part of his employment duties. He attempted to throw
a piece of coal out of the car, but it was deflected and struck him on
the cheek, causing a profusely bleeding wound. The wound was
bandaged but required continuing care for about a year and a half,
when the presence of cancer was discovered.
In allowing recovery, the Supreme Court of Minnesota noted:
It is not for us to decide as a scientific fact that trauma causes
cancer or that cancer is a medical mystery. The employee . . .
suffered an injury . . . at a place previously free from blemish.
Under constant care, it developed a malignant growth which was
eventually diagnosed as cancer. The circumstance alone is pretty
strong evidence that the injury was the proximate cause of the re-
sult, and would be quite convincing to the mind of a layman. There
is no apparent break in the chain of causation.58
Thus, the sequence-of-events test has four elements: (1) The apparent
(Continued from preceding page)
(1957); Baumstein v. Siegel & Alenikoff, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 572, 189 N.Y.S. 2d 431
(1959); Glenn v. National Supply Co., 101 Ohio App. 6, 129 N.E. 2d 189 (1954);
Glover v. Columbia Hosp., supra n. 17; Boyd v. Young, supra n. 2; Harbor Plywood
Corp. v. Department of Labor & Indus., supra n. 2.
52 Sikora v. Apex Beverage Corp., supra n. 17.
53 Ricciardi v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., supra n. 51; Frankenheim v. B. Altman & Co.,
supra n. 33.
54 Broussard v. Union Sulphur Co., 5 La. App. 340 (1927); Slemba v. Hamilton &
Sons, 290 Pa. 267, 138 A. 841 (1927); Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm., supra n. 2.
55 Whitten v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 257 F. 2d 699 (5th Cir. 1958); Woodbury v. Frank
B. Arata Fruit Co., 64 Idaho 227, 130 P. 2d 870 (1942); Taylor v. Mansfield Hardwood
Lumber Co., 65 S. 2d 360 (La. App. 1953).
56 Eidman, supra n. 41; Russell & Clark, supra n. 4; Warren, supra n. 13.
57 Cases cited n. 46 supra.
58 Id.
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good health of the individual prior to the injury.5 9 (2) The immediate
appearance of disability symptoms subsequent to the injury.60  (3)
Persistent and perceptible symptoms from the injury to discovery of the
tumor.6 ' (4) The progressive deterioration of the individual's health.6 2
In Dennison v. Wing, 3 Dr. Ewing's postulates0 4 were used to detri-
ment of the plaintiff. The plaintiff fractured her left clavicle and re-
ceived a contusion of the left shoulder and upper chest in an automobile
collision. The testimony of the attending doctor indicated that he had
noted no breast injury. During the month after leaving the hospital,
the plaintiff made several visits to an orthopedic specialist for treatment
of shoulder pain. A couple of days after her discharge by this doctor,
the plaintiff observed "a little pimple on the left breast in the armpit."
Three and a half years later, when the pimple became as "hard and
big as a nut," breast cancer was discovered, requiring radical mastec-
tomy.
The jury found that the accident caused the cancer, but the Ap-
pellate Division set aside the jury's verdict, placing great emphasis on
Dr. Ewing's postulates. Two of the postulates were pertinent: the cancer
must develop exactly at the site of the injury, and the cancer must not
reach detectable size until there has been a sufficient time interval after
the injury for it to develop. The court noted that the type of cancer
involved was a very slow growing cancer and that it was quite in-
consistent with the postulates that this cancer could have been detectable
within two months after the injury. Furthermore, since the cancer
did not develop at the exact situs of the injury, the court concluded
that the breast cancer was not caused by the impact trauma of the
accident.
A recent case which combines both the sequence-of-events test and
Ewing's postulates is Hanna v. Aetna Ins. Co.63 The plaintiff brought
suit for injuries allegedly sustained by his wife, a passenger in an auto-
mobile accident. The impact jerked her backwards and then threw her
59 Dundee Woolen Mills v. Chism, supra n. 23; Baynes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 101
Ga. App. 85, 112 S.E. 2d 826 (1960); Lyons v. Swift & Co., supra n. 51; Pittman v.
Pillsbury Flour Mills Inc., supra n. 2; Milne v. Atlantic Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 137
N.J.L. 583, 61 A. 2d 225 (1948); Menarde v. Philadelphia Trans. Co., supra n. 32;
Emma v. A. D. Julliard & Co., supra n. 16.
60 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Rowand, 197 F. 2d 283 (5th Cir. 1952); Eliades v. Atlantic
Mut. Ins. Co., 2 App. Div. 2d 618, 151 N.Y.S. 2d 771 (1956); Valente v. Bourne Mills,
77 R.I. 274, 75 A. 2d 191 (1950); Sligh v. Newberry Elec. Co-op., supra n. 2.
61 Dundee Woolen Mills v. Chism, supra n. 23; Lee v. Blessing, supra n. 2; O'Neill
v. Babcock & Wilcox, 19 N.J. Misc. 659, 23 A. 2d 116 (1941); Baumstein v. Siegel &
Alenikoff, Inc., supra n. 51.
62 Hagy v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 122 Cal. App. 2d 361, 265 P. 2d 86 (1953);
Baynes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., supra n. 59; Pittman v. Pillsbury Flour Mills, Inc.,
supra n. 2; Milne v. Atlantic Mach. Tool Works, Inc., supra n. 59.
63 Supra n. 37.
64 J. Ewing, supra n. 20.




forward, onto her knees and into the projection of the dashboard on
which she struck her left breast. A month later the plaintiff's wife
noticed a bruise on her left breast in the area of the trauma. Two
months after the injury, she noticed that touching the left breast pained
her and that intermittent drainage was occurring. A month later her
doctor found a lump at the site of the original bruise. A malignant,
nonmetastasized mass was excised, and the entire left breast was re-
moved.
Approximately two months prior to the accident, her doctor had
examined her breasts and found them normal and free of lumps and
masses. Thus, both Ewing's first postulate and the first factor of the
sequence-of-events test were satisfied. The second factor in the se-
quence-of-events test requires the immediate appearance of disability
symptoms. Mrs. Hanna satisfied this requirement in that she experienced
pain coupled with her discovery of a bruise in the immediate area of
trauma, subsequent to the injury. The second postulate is also satis-
fied in that the nature, authenticity, and severity of the trauma is docu-
mented.
At this point a divergence occurs in that the third factor of the
sequence-of-events test requires continuity of pain from the time of
the injury until the discovery of the cancer. The postulates make no
such requirement. Thus, Mrs. Hanna's continued discomfort satisfied
the third sequence-of-events factor and has no adverse effect upon the
establishment of any of the postulates.
The fourth and final factor in the sequence-of-events test also is
not included in and does not affect the postulates. Mrs. Hanna satisfied
the fourth factor in that a bruise was discovered, she experienced a
tingling sensation which later developed into pain, an intermittent drain-
age began to occur from the bruised area, and finally a cancerous mass
developed. The last event in this chain, the discovery of cancer, also
satisfied the third postulate.
The remaining three postulates were also satisfied: (1) The cancer
developed at the exact situs of the trauma, (2) a reasonable time rela-
tionship of three months was established between the date of trauma
and the appearance of the cancer, and (3) the cancer was found in the
duct rather than in the lymph-nodes, indicating that the cancer was of
a nonmetastasic origin.
Thus, the court was presented with the satisfaction of both Ewing's
postulates and the sequence-of-events factors. The court held that the
plaintiff had sustained his burden of proof to establish that the trauma
and the cancer were causally related. The court stated that the pathol-
ogist's conclusion (based on the sequence-of-events test) of trau-
matically induced cancer was "buttressed" by Ewing's postulates.
An often cited case on the issue of whether the injury aggravated
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1971
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or accelerated a pre-existing tumor is Sikora v. Apex Beverage Corp.66
While walking down a ramp in a subway station, the plaintiff slipped
and fell in front of a soda vending machine owned and operated by
defendant corporation. Presumably, the fall was caused by soda that
had either leaked from the machine or had been spilled by a patron.
The plaintiff's injuries were inconsequential except for the claimed ag-
gravation of an existing breast cancer. The plaintiff testified that he
first noticed a lump about the size of a pea on his right breast about a
week after the accident. Within a few months it had grown to the size
of a walnut and was diagnosed as cancer.
The plaintiff immediately conceded that the inception of cancer
ante-dated the accident and was not caused by it. This move was per-
haps prompted by the court's earlier decision in Dennison v. Wing,
67
which held that there must be a reasonable time between the injury
and the appearance of the tumor (Ewing's fifth postulate). The ap-
pearance of the "pea-sized" lump after only a week's time would not
satisfy this postulate. Thus, the plaintiff proceeded on a theory of ag-
gravation, but in this instance the court did not relieve the plaintiff
from establishing that the trauma was to the exact tumor situs.68 Two
physicians, a pathologist, and a radiologist testified that the trans-
mission of force to the breast region caused by a fall on the back was
sufficient to satisfy this requirement. Nevertheless, the court, noting that
the doctor's opinions were not "grounded on scientific fact," concluded:
In the absence of a direct blow to the site of the cancer or
spreading into surrounding areas, there is no adequate basis for be-
lieving that the growth of the cancer was in any way affected or
accelerated by plaintiff's fall.
The case of Daniels v. American Airlines, Inc.6 9 encompassed both
causation and aggravation. The claimant sustained an injury to his left
testicle when he stepped into a hole in the aisle of a darkened air-
plane. A physician diagnosed his injury as "traumatic orchitis of the
left testicle." The prescribed treatment involved medication for the pain
and the use of a scrotal suspensory. The claimant's condition suffi-
ciently improved so as to allow his return to normal employment duties.
Six months later an examination revealed the testicle to be "a little
larger" than upon previous examination. Suspecting that the claim-
ant was suffering from a left testicular tumor, the physician advised an
operation. A biopsy revealed the presence of a malignancy, and the
testicle and a portion of the spermatic cord were then surgically ex-
cised.
66 Supra n. 17.
67 Supra n. 37.
68 See text at n. 52.




Hearings were conducted wherein a referee found accidental causa-
tion to have been established. On appeal the sole issue was whether
or not there was substantial evidence supportive of the finding of
causality. Medical testimony was in conflict as to whether the trauma
caused or aggravated a malignant tumor of the testis. The court held
that the proof favoring causation did not lack "rational support" in the
record. Obviously, the court did not require that the claimant choose
whether the injury caused or accelerated the tumor. A trend may de-




Medical science allows a theory to be viewed as factual knowledge
only when sufficient experimental data is compiled which confirms the
theory. The courts, however, require only reasonable certainty in order
to establish the legal concept of causation. This legal concept of causa-
tion is'illustrated in the early case of Hogan v. Twin City Amusement
Trust Estate: 71
The proof required to establish the relation of cause and effect
between an injury and a subsequent ailment must be such as to
take the case out of the realm of conjecture, but, if the evidence
furnishes a reasonable basis for an inference that the injury was
the cause of what followed, that is sufficient ...
Most modern courts, following their predecessors, also require that the
proof be based on reasonable medical probabilities.7 2 However, some
jurisdictions require strict proof of all of Ewing's postulates in order to
sustain a recovery for traumatic cancer. The jurisdictions which fol-
low the sequence-of-events test are, perhaps, more in tune with the legal
concept of causation. Their ranks appear to be increasing, but because
of the insufficiency of numbers of trauma-cancer cases, major new trends
are not readily discernible. Until medical science discovers the actual
causes of cancer, the courts must rely on a logical chain of events as
evidenced by the sequence-of-events test.
70 Cases cited n. 23 supra.
71 Supra n. 24.
72 Employers' Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Parker, 418 S.W. 2d 570 (Tex. Civ. App.
1967); Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n. v. Gallegos, 415 S.W. 2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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